Civic Virtue Out of Necessity: Patriotism and Democratic Education by Ben-Porath, Sigal R.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
GSE Publications Graduate School of Education
March 2007
Civic Virtue Out of Necessity: Patriotism and
Democratic Education
Sigal R. Ben-Porath
University of Pennsylvania, sigalbp@gse.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/gse_pubs
Postprint version. Published in Theory and Research in Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, March 2007, pages 41-59.
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878507073608
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/gse_pubs/161
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ben-Porath, S. R. (2007). Civic Virtue Out of Necessity: Patriotism and Democratic Education. Retrieved from
http://repository.upenn.edu/gse_pubs/161
Civic Virtue Out of Necessity: Patriotism and Democratic Education
Abstract
In this paper I argue for considering patriotism as a civic virtue, and in particular I defend the view that
patriotism should be endorsed under certain conditions as a perspective suitable for teaching in public
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My argument begins with an exposé to the debate on patriotism as virtue between those who endorse it as a
requisite of morality and those who reject it as an abomination. I defend a position which describes patriotism
as a civic virtue rather than a primary moral virtue. ['why a virtue?']. Next I consider what it means to be a
citizen in times of war, focusing on the changing conceptions and manifestations of patriotism under fire
['why a necessity?'] I proceed to suggest that the qualified notion of patriotism which I defend should affect
the way public schools create citizens, particularly in times of war ['why in schools?']. By 'affect' I do not mean
a wholehearted endorsement; rather I mean a sincere consideration, which starts from public schools' basic
democratic commitments, but nonetheless acknowledges the moral realities of a society at war, among them
the heightened sense of the love of country.
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CIVIC VIRTUE OUT OF NECESSITY: PATRIOTISM AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 
Sigal Ben-Porath 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
In this paper I argue for considering patriotism as a civic virtue, and in particular I  
defend the view that patriotism should be endorsed under certain conditions as a 
perspective suitable for teaching in public schools.  
My argument begins with an exposé to the debate on patriotism as virtue between 
those who endorse it as a requisite of morality and those who reject it as an abomination. 
I defend a position which describes patriotism as a civic virtue rather than a primary 
moral virtue. [‘why a virtue?’]. Next I consider what it means to be a citizen in times of 
war, focusing on the changing conceptions and manifestations of patriotism under fire 
[‘why a necessity?’] I proceed to suggest that the qualified notion of patriotism which I 
defend should affect the way public schools create citizens, particularly in times of war 
[‘why in schools?’]. By ‘affect’ I do not mean a wholehearted endorsement; rather I mean 
a sincere consideration, which starts from public schools’ basic democratic commitments, 
but nonetheless acknowledges the moral realities of a society at war, among them the 
heightened sense of the love of country.  
 
Why a Virtue? 
The suggestion that patriotism is a virtue, I sense, requires immediate 
qualification: I do not argue here for patriotism as virtue the way most famously 
MacIntyre (1995) does – I do not suggest that patriotism is a moral requirement. When I 
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propose that patriotism be identified as part of a list of civic virtues, I qualify it as a 
special or derivative virtue, namely, a virtue that is dependent on place and time rather 
than a universal moral characteristic worthy of pursuing in most all human contexts. The 
virtue of patriotism is correlated with what Scheffler (2003) calls ‘associative duties,’ 
which are a subclass of ‘special duties.’ MacIntyre like Scheffler, describes patriotism as 
a derivation of associational duties: the nation has bestowed on me certain goods, both 
material and other, and therefore I owe the nation my gratitude and loyalty. These are 
expressed by a patriotic attitude, which is the preference for my nation over others.  
Like other civic virtues, patriotism is dependent on a democratic context; like 
tolerance it is best practiced in the context of a group which endorses democratic 
premises. My current argument for patriotism as virtue goes against portrayals such as 
Nussbaum’s who famously stated that an “emphasis on patriotic pride is both morally 
dangerous and, ultimately, subversive of some of the worthy goals patriotism sets out to 
serve -- for example, the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of 
justice and equality.” (Nussbaum 1994) Contrastingly I suggest that patriotism should be 
acknowledged by philosophers, educators and public intellectuals for what it is in this and 
other countries, namely, a moral reality worthy of recognition, consideration and 
endorsement into a democratic public sphere, including a comprehensive curriculum. 
Simon Keller has recently suggested in an Ethics article that patriotism is a form 
of loyalty not grounded in “neutral judgment that its object has certain valuable 
characteristics,” although it is based on an assumption that its object – i.e. the nation – 
does have those valuable characteristics. Thus the valuable characteristics, which could 
include high moral standing, commitment to noble values etc., are not neutrally judged to 
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be presented in the nation’s acts or inclinations. Rather, they are merely presumed, and 
patriotism is deduced from these unfounded presumptions. This logically shaky structure 
provides the basis for morally weighty decisions, some of which are expected from nation 
members (or the patriots among them). Consequently Keller concludes that patriotism is 
bad faith, and suggests that any of its possible instrumental values (such as generosity or 
a sense of belonging) can be outweighed by instrumental disvalues (such as war and 
stupidity). 
I believe Keller misses the point by focusing on patriotism as an individual 
judgment. First, because patriotism is not a judgment but rather a sentiment. As such, it 
does not require sound logical justifications, just as other sentiments we have are not 
expected to be soundly justified by logical argumentations or factual references. What 
needs to be justified is not patriotism itself, but rather its social repercussions (or as 
Keller refers to them, values and disvalues). By contrast, racism can be rejected based on 
an argument such as Keller’s. Racism is indeed a contention that one race is better than 
the other, based on assumed superior characteristics of that race, and without any 
reference to the actual justifiability of this assumption. In addition, racism carries grave 
social consequences. We condemn racism because of its ‘bad faith’ constitution as well 
as for its negative consequences (or disvalues) to the democratic public sphere, and to 
individual members of the state. This comparison clarifies the weakness of Keller’s 
argument against patriotism. While my nation may not indeed be morally superior to 
other nations, it is very often superior to other nations for me. In espousing positive 
sentiments to my nation as a home, I do not generate any moral and logical fallacies. As 
for the social repercussions of my love of country, most of them can be amended by a 
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qualified construction of patriotism in the public debate. The notion of patriotism I wish 
to justify is less open to Keller’s criticism about social disvalues, as it regards patriotism 
not as an individual requisite but rather as a commitment to a shared project. This 
approach to patriotism is distanced from Keller’s, without going all the way toward 
MacIntyre’s claim that patriotism is one’s duty of loyalty and gratitude. Similarly 
Nussbaum’s concern that patriotism goes against striving for justice could as well be 
eased if patriotism is viewed as a shared project rather than as a moral requirement. What 
I offer is not so much a middle way, as a contention that there is something to be taken 
from each of the two perspectives (represented here through MacIntyre and Keller) when 
considering the teaching of civic virtues in public schools.  
Civic virtues are often regarded, mainly for educational purposes, as supplements 
to civic knowledge and skills. Citizens need to know their government’s structure and 
procedures; they need to acquire the skills to take part in these processes through civic 
means. Some argue for the development of civic virtues to complete the set of 
requirements for the formation of civicly minded citizenry. Many liberal political 
theorists tend to avoid the discussion of civic virtues, preferring to focus on qualities of 
the state and social procedures rather than on the soulcraft of citizens. This by no means 
is a general reluctance: Rawls for one identifies a number of civic virtues, including 
reasonableness and fair-mindedness. More recently, Richard Dagger described republican 
liberalism as a civic approach that is founded on civicly minded citizens who have 
developed a set of civic virtues, first among them the respect for each other’s rights. But 
even among those philosophers who cite civic virtues as part of their perspective, the love 
of country is not usually considered a virtue. Nussbaum and other liberals reject 
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patriotism in favor of universalism, cosmopolitanism or other related values, suggesting 
that “justice and equality… would be better served by an ideal that is in any case more 
adequate to our situation in the contemporary world, namely the very old ideal of the 
cosmopolitan, the person whose primary allegiance is to the community of human beings 
in the entire world.” (Nussbaum 1994) Following the Kantian tradition some 
contemporary liberal (and radical) authors suggest that education should aim at 
overcoming national attachments, whether in favor of cosmopolitan affiliation or of an 
individualized, ‘unencumbered’ self (Yack, forthcoming). For some critics, patriotism is 
merely “a primordial attachment to a territory and a society” (Janowitz 1983, 8) Many 
argue for mutual respect, tolerance, an ability to compromise and other attitudes or 
sentiments as virtues that offer a sound basis for the proper functioning of civil society. 
To include patriotism in this list means to suggest that the love of one’s particular nation 
is another such component, and that in order to be a good citizen of this particular nation-
state one should preferably develop a sentimental affiliation with the nation. Some 
authors indeed suggest that patriotism (or devout membership in a nation) is compatible 
with liberalism, although they do not always view it as a virtuous position. Miller, Tamir 
and others try to interlace national sentiments with liberal values, to the point of 
suggesting that the two can be mutually reinforcing. Some suggest that ‘liberal 
nationalism’ is not only desirable but also possible, as the affiliation with one’s nation 
can support a commitment to the liberal values which one associates with the nation-
state. In this they share Gutmann’s perception that patriotism should be constrained by 
democratic or liberal values. Patriotism, Gutmann (1999, 312) maintains, “is a sentiment 
rather than a moral perspective.” To properly respond to this sentiment in the context of 
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education, theorists must explicitly discuss civic virtues as part of the broader picture of a 
just society. They should not (and usually do not) defend it in its basic expression of “my 
country, right or wrong.” This would create a risk of uncritical acceptance of wrongful 
actions by the state. “A democratic education opposes this kind of patriotism when it 
encourages students to think about their collective lives in morally principled terms.” 
(Gutmann 2002, 49) Thus democratic education constrains patriotic education with the 
principles of a democratic polity.  
By contrast, MacIntyre suggests the possible endorsement of patriotism as a moral 
requisite of a good citizen, and indeed of a moral human being. He contends that if it is a 
virtue, “patriotism is one of a class of loyalty-exhibiting virtues” (1995, 4) in which an 
individual is committed to develop an appreciation of her nation because of particularized 
goods she has received from it. The depiction of patriotism as a sentimental commitment 
arising from past goods bestowed on one by the state equates the nation to a family in 
which children owe their parents gratitude for their contributions to their growth and 
well-being. This equation is justifiably rejected by many theorists as unfounded, 
inaccurate and misleading. Let me point to what most theorists miss in their critique, and 
what seems to me to be the weakest aspect of this strongest description of patriotism, and 
than try to amend it. This characterization of patriotism as an associative virtue related to 
gratitude is what draws most of the criticism against describing it as a civic virtue. The 
distinctive feature of this defense of patriotism which sets it apart from other civic virtues 
is its temporality. While other civic virtues are described and justified in a forward-
looking manner, patriotism is defended by turning to the past. Other virtues – fair 
mindedness, or respect for rights – are considered to be tools for generating a desirable 
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public sphere, for example, or as attitudes that support the possibility of a civil form of 
deliberation. They are virtues in both a contextual and an instrumental sense – they are 
desirable if they are developed in a social context of democracy (or liberal democracy); 
and they are desirable only inasmuch as they support and enhance the possibility of a 
stable, flourishing civil society and democratic governance. I suggest that this temporal 
difference is the main weakness of the patriotism of the sort that MacIntyre and Scheffler 
defend (and Keller and Nussbaum criticize). And it too can be corrected by considering 
patriotism as a commitment to a shared project, a forward-looking civic virtue. By 
describing patriotism as a future-oriented civic virtue arising from a commitment to a 
shared national project, it can be introduced into the sphere of liberal civic virtues, along 
with fair mindedness, a public spirit, mutual respect and the other more widely accepted 
virtues. Much like the other virtues, a certain form of patriotism is required for the 
preservation and thriving of a democratic society. A stronger case can be made for this 
claim in times of war (as I argue in the next section). Thus, whereas Keller would rid the 
public sphere of patriotism altogether, and Gutmann would constrain patriotism by the 
principles of liberal-democracy, I would offer it an equal standing among the civic 
virtues. When properly developed and manifested, patriotism supports some of the aims 
of a democratic polity, much like tolerance, concern for the public good, or respect for 
rights.  
Patriotism as I understand it is a sense of affiliation with one’s nation as an actual 
geopolitical phenomenon from which one receives various material and other goods, as 
well as a commitment to this nation as a shared project with one’s fellow countrymen. 
This sentiment is woven of past experiences, present perceptions, and future expectations, 
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and it relates to one’s understanding of her identity as well as to her beliefs about her 
relations to others (who she perceives of as nation members).  
Patriotism is thus an element of personal identity, as Richard Rorty suggests, 
much as it is a component of political organization and mobilization; it is comprised of a 
sense of personal gratitude for past acts (owed or offered) but also as importantly a 
commitment for common participation in the continued shared project, based on a 
perception of shared fate. It is thus a civic virtue, constrained like other virtues only by its 
perceived effects on the constitution of a desirable public sphere.  
Just like tolerance could be abused to pursue inappropriate goals, so patriotism 
can be the last refuge of the scoundrel. However, theorists and politicians do not abandon 
tolerance in the face of its abuses but rather strive to both cultivate and constrain it in an 
effort to best apply it to the democratic circumstances at hand. Tolerance can be abuse to 
promote illiberal or even anti-democratic activity; it can allow for groups who oppress 
their own members to freely do so; it can let groups who preach discrimination against 
other individuals and groups to flourish. The common response among citizens and 
theorists who care about democracy is not to forgo all attempt to argue for and implement 
tolerance. Rather the common, and justified, response is to clarify, qualify and implement 
tolerance in ways that would support rather than hinder the democratic aims of justice.  
Similarly patriotism should be viewed as a special virtue, aiming to point at its 
moral and political instrumental significance while preventing some of its less desirable 
repercussions. Patriotism is indeed a sentiment, as Gutmann claims, but so is respect. 
When considering civic virtues, including sentiments and attitudes, we are interested in 
the public manifestations, and their effects on the democratic character of the state.  
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When patriotism is properly conceptualized as a shared project, contributing to 
the generation and preservation of a democratic public sphere, it supports deliberation, 
mutual respect and stability. It thus becomes part of the package of civic virtues that 
support a democratic public sphere.  
I now consider why during times of conflict this virtue stands out as deserving 
stronger public and scholarly attention. 
 
Why a necessity? 
The conflation of patriotism with liberal values is doubtful in peaceful times, and 
the circumstances of an armed or a protracted conflict clearly do not support this 
portrayal. To the contrary, war, security threats and protracted conflicts generate a 
narrow, often illiberal form of patriotism which is part of what I call ‘belligerent 
citizenship.’ 
In wartime more than in other time, certain forms of patriotism may in fact be part 
of the manifestations of good citizenship, and indeed that it could be described as a 
virtue, because of its contribution to the maintenance of a flourishing, stable democratic 
society. Patriotism is both a moral reality and a valuable factor in a democratic polity, 
and more so in times of conflict. 
Wartime generates a set of social processes which can result in 
reconceptualization of the relations between individual and state, termed here ‘belligerent 
citizenship.’ This conceptualization of citizenship can be described as a return to a crude 
Hobbesian model of the state, as a protector of individuals’ lives from the dangers 
embedded in the ‘state of nature’ and provide them with an opportunity to live more 
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peacefully. The expectations of citizenship in times of war narrow down to resemble this 
type of relations with the state, in which government can expect much of its citizens in 
exchange for their protection from violent death.  
Thus a belligerent conceptualization of citizenship emerges as a response to perceived 
threats to national security. Regarded through this narrow lens, the first responsibility of 
the state toward its members, as it is quickly reconfigured in the public sphere, is to 
protect their lives. This responsibility overrides the demand for civil liberties, and those 
are often steamrolled over by the overpowering sense of urgency to fight for survival (see 
Hardin 2004). The support of free speech diminishes, both through the criminalization of 
incitement, and through the suppression of deviating opinions via social mechanisms 
which command unity of voice and subscription to a narrow form of patriotism. 
Belligerent citizenship is distinctly characterized by a reinterpreted notion of three key 
components of democratic citizenship, namely participation, unity and solidarity (also 
known as patriotism) and public deliberation. In times of war these take the form of an 
emphasis on citizens’ contribution to the country rather than on voluntary participation; 
support for social unity and patriotism over diversity; and consequently, the 
discouragement of deliberation. (In Israel, see Barzilai 1992; Kimmerling 1993) 
This description of belligerent citizenship does not seem to coincide with the liberal 
values of democratic citizenship, nor does it seem to support the outline I described of 
patriotism as civic virtue. By presenting the least favorable depiction of patriotism, I hope 
to render my consequent defense of it as civic virtue more credible and less suspect of 
sentimentality and bad faith. Thus, before I go on to defend patriotism in the context of 
war despite these apparent inadequacies, let me expand a little more on what I view as the 
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most significant disvalue of belligerent patriotism, namely, its incongruence with 
autonomy.  
Acting autonomously, Rawls (1971, 516) tell us, “is acting from principles that we would 
consent to as free and equal rational beings.” Joseph Raz suggests that autonomy is 
comprised of the ability and the opportunity to choose among morally significant options. 
One of his counter examples is particularly helpful for my discussion. Raz describes a 
woman on a deserted island, who is hounded by a fierce beast (Raz 1988, 373-4). All she 
can do is plan the next step of her escape. Although no visible coercion is involved, we 
still cannot describe her life as autonomous. Raz’s view is that a life of struggle and 
suffering, with no morally significant alternatives to choose from, cannot be an 
autonomous life.  
This view has some productive implications to a variety of human circumstances, 
including extreme poverty, abuse and various forms of social coercion. Here I focus on 
the question of developing a sense of affiliation with the state, or national membership, 
which make up the required attitudinal basis for the development of patriotism. This is 
the case both in peaceful times and in times of war, or a protracted conflict. Ongoing 
circumstances of conflict tend to generate a sense of vulnerability, fear and sometimes 
despair. It posits the state as a benevolent benefactor, who can potentially save the group 
or its members from immediate threats.  
Can the development of patriotic sentiments in these circumstances be considered 
autonomous? Brighouse (2000, 66) discusses the requirement of free formation of 
preferences, and suggests that “it is true of the highwayman’s victim that she genuinely 
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wants to give up her worldly wealth when presented with the options ‘your money or 
your life’. But her preference, while genuine, is not fully autonomous.” 
Consequently, some criticize the belligerent forms of patriotism as unreflective, 
uncritical, jingoistic and illiberal. Many are concerned with the priority given in the 
belligerent public sphere to security and national sentiment over individual rights and 
liberties. Although I share many of these concerns, I believe the desirable response is 
more complex then the one offered so far in the scholarly and public debate. I suggest 
that at least the type of patriotism that is part of the knee-jerk response to conflict – the 
rally around the flag, the sense of unity, the feeling that ‘we’re all in this together’ – 
should more accurately be portrayed not as bad faith, as Keller suggests, but rather as 
tough luck. In other words, wartime patriotism is not a simple jingoistic uncritical 
response, worthy of dismissal or harsh criticism, but rather a moral reality which arises 
from socio-psychological needs, and demands our attention and public philosophical 
consideration. Analyzed carefully, it can be shown to carry significant socio-political 
repercussions, including a host of potential advantages and civic opportunities. 
Wartime creates a special need to protect democratic commitments in a contextual 
way, responding to the unique social circumstances of war. It creates a greater need to 
foster and enhance civic relations among members of the nation, to expand the public 
agenda, to encourage participation and engagement, and to support an inclusive 
conception of citizenship. The ways in which civil society and the education system 
perceive of citizenship and national membership can affect their ability to foster these 
commitments. It is thus crucial to maintain that the special identification with one’s 
country is not only a sentimental response to security threats (although it is partly that 
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too). It is also a mechanism for sustaining the strain conflict creates. Dismissing these 
sentiments or ignoring them in the public sphere and in the classroom may create 
antagonism, it may backfire, or it may render the civic educational effort detached and 
irrelevant. It would be more useful as well as justified to work with the national 
sentiments (rather than against them or apart from them). This is even more important in 
wartime than in peaceful eras, for those emotions take a more central place in the public 
life of a nation at war, serving the needs of endurance through periods of uncertainty and 
threats. 
Of course, not all moral realities should be endorsed. Racism is a constant moral 
reality in this country as in many others. The mere fact that some people – maybe many 
people – strongly support racist views and hold them as defensible and even 
indispensable, does not turn them into virtues in any way. They remain abominations that 
deserve nothing but rejection as they are inherently contradictory to democratic values. 
Some theorists like Keller seem to regard patriotism as belonging to the same class of 
moral realities that need to be uprooted. They seem to equate the love of country with 
chauvinism and uncritical endorsement of the nation. But if we accept political-
psychological evidence (Bar-Tal 1996) on the merits of this sense of patriotic unity to 
endurance in wartime we need to develop a more careful approach that does not reject 
patriotism, particularly in times of conflict when these values become stronger and more 
urgently needed. At the same time, we should not assume a compatibility of patriotism 
and liberalism, as this assumption is not readily warranted by wartime expressions of 
belligerent patriotism. We need to recognize the problematic nature of wartime patriotism 
while acknowledging its value to the individual and to the short-term endurance goals of 
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society. From there we need to structure a political educational process that would 
expand these values to the long-term, democratic (and possibly peaceful) vision of the 
state. In other words, we need to find ways to overcome the disvalues of wartime 
patriotism and to reconcile its immediate advantages with the long term aims of 
democratic, peaceful existence. By so doing, as I hope to demonstrate, we can also ease 
the tension between patriotic unity and the facilitation of autonomy. 
The instrumental emotional and social values of wartime patriotism warrant a 
serious consideration by the main social institutions, in particular the public education 
system. Most theorists regard the conceptualization of citizenship as identity not solely as 
a descriptive project, but rather as an educational endeavor. Schools, like other public 
institutions, need not endorse this stance uncritically, for it carries significant 
instrumental disvalues as well, in particular, a diminished regard for individual liberties, 
and a narrowed public agenda. However, they need to find ways to foster and expand it, 
in order to allow for it to be expressed alongside the other civic virtues, thus supporting 
the flourishing of a democratic society even in times of war. 
 
One of the most greatest challenges to expressing diverse conceptions of 
patriotism in schools arises in the field of social studies, and particularly in the study of 
national history (see discussion in Smith 2003). Let us take a look at the debate over 
teaching history in public schools, and how the notion of patriotism as a shared project 
which I defend would affect it. 
 
Teaching History in Times of War – The Post 9/11 American Debate 
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The challenges educators and scholars regularly face in the realm of patriotic 
education, are posed with a greater sense of urgency in times of conflict, when patriotism 
is perceived to be a national security matter. As is stated in the opening remarks of 
Education for democracy, After September 11 “The issue of defending our democracy 
was no longer an abstraction, the question of civic education no longer an option.”(Albert 
Shanker Institute 2003, 3) “It may be” the study continues, “that September 11 presents 
us with a moment, an opportunity for civic renewal.”(ibid., 9) 
In a review of history textbooks published by the conservative Fordham 
foundation, Finn laments the use of third person language in describing historical events, 
such as when portraying 9/11 as a “tragedy” that  “happened”: 
I've dubbed such verb usages the "irresponsible impersonal" voice 
and, regrettably, they're more norm than exception in U.S. history 
textbooks… things happen in these books (though not necessarily in 
chronological order), but not because anybody causes them. Hence, 
nobody deserves admiration or contempt for having done something 
incredibly wonderful or abominably evil …The result: …a collective loss 
of American memory (Ravitch 2004). 
Finn is disheartened by this form of history he finds in high school textbooks 
because he worries that these book commonly fail to “establish a narrative of events with 
a strong sense of context.” Other studies expressed similar concerns before 9/11: “Faith 
in progress and patriotic pride have vanished,” bemoans a 2000 report on history 
textbooks (Sewall 2000) 
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On the other hand, authors like Chomsky and Giroux have been warning against 
the stifling effects of the same patriotic pride that Finn wishes for, at times of peace and 
even more urgently in times of conflicts. Where Finn (and other conservative 
commentators) finds no sense of cause and an alarming loss of national pride, Chomsky 
(and other left wing commentators) sees a vehement attack on democratic ideals through 
uncritical endorsement of patriotism. Chomsky (2000, 28) commented: “True democratic 
teaching is not about instilling patriotism.” In a similar vain, Giroux criticizes the blunt 
response of the American administration and the public sphere to the September 11 
attacks, and the fear and hatred they brood. In an all-encompassing critique of the rise of 
patriotic pride, the attack on free speech, the threat on academic freedom and other 
disconcerting effects, Giroux (2003) argues that “ignorance and arrogance are no 
substitute for reasoned analyses, critical understanding, and an affirmation of democratic 
principles of social justice.” (25) 
These two contrasting perspectives suggest that the teaching of patriotism should 
either be endorsed without questions, through the narrowest understanding of the term, or 
it should be rejected as a jingoistic attempt to quell legitimate political criticism and 
independent thought. Because these are some of the most visible perspectives in the field, 
many history teachers and school administrators find it hard to navigate between the two, 
sensing that these are the only alternatives. Teachers considering the liberal perspective 
such as that of Giroux or Loewen (1995) and the more conservative one such as Finn’s or 
Ravitch’s (2003) have a hard time figuring out what students should ideally know about 
the nation’s history. The first accuses existing history textbooks and standards as over-
patriotic, shallowly optimistic and hero-worshiping; the second warns from a tendency to 
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reduce history to a narrow list of disconnected facts which are so focused on equal 
representation that they fail to convey any sense of national narrative. Both reject 
‘ideology’ as an unfit component for textbooks and classroom interaction, and insist that 
teaching materials should stir clear of ideological partialities. The navigation between the 
bluntly termed ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ conceptions of history and history-teaching 
becomes more acute in times of national conflict, when the pressure to teach ‘the correct 
form’ of history or to inculcate the ‘required values’ – be them liberal commitments to 
civil liberties, or conservative forms of patriotism – are deemed essential to national 
survival. The more professioanlist view, such as Schlesinger’s plea to teach history for 
it’s own sake, its tangibility questionable even in peaceful times, becomes impossible 
(and, I suggest, not altogether desirable) in times of conflict. In another widely-circulated 
publication of the Fordham foundation, the author claims that “In the wake of September 
11” the influence of liberal scholars and authors is “more destructive than ever.” He 
explains: 
Young Americans are being consciously taught to hate and be 
ashamed of their nation's history and to believe that America is a uniquely 
evil and oppressive society. (2003)  
Thus most available texts, including the publications cited above, offer a strict 
choice between “moral relativism” and “moral clarity” if they are conservative; or 
between “critical thought” and “jingoism” if they are liberal. There is no need here for a 
detailed exploration of the reasons why critical thinking does not have to amount to moral 
relativism, in which any “opinion – your, mine, Osama Bin-Laden’s” (Stern 2003, 35) is 
similarly respected; and why a call for a contextual understanding of history through 
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various tools, including heroic tales, does not have to amount to “lies my teachers told 
me.” Clearly what educators and educational administrators could use is a nuanced, 
contextualizes discussion of patriotism in times of conflict and beyond them. When 
teaching patriotism as civic virtue, we should heed Murphy’s warning about textbooks’ 
tendency to distort, sanitize or falsify history in order to advance particularistic (or bigot) 
ideologies. Not only does a sanitized version of history (or literature, or biology) subvert 
the truth, proving it intellectually problematic, it also stands the risk of creating an 
attitudinal backlash, generating an abandonment of the desired approach (such as 
patriotism) altogether. 
In the context of conflict the need to endorse an expansive notion of education is 
more pressing, as the list of topics considered worthy of public debate narrows down, 
along with the scope of perspectives on those topics. The expansive form of civic 
education is aimed at strengthening attitudes necessary for national survival, both in the 
short- and the long term sense. The more immediate or short-term aim of survival and 
endurance requires learning to feel and be united as a nation, believe in the just causes 
that guide the nation, and endorse a positive version of its narrative – in short, they 
require patriotic unity. The long-term values and perceptions required for national 
endurance in times of conflict are primarily related to democratic principles, practices 
and commitments. Both types of aims must be endorsed for civic education to be 
worthwhile, particularly in times of war. Abandoning the short-term aims may increase 
society’s vulnerability and weaken the perseverance powers of the nation and its 
members. Abandoning the long term aims may render the nation vulnerable to a 
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diminished sense of purpose, a decline in civic engagement, and a lack of common 
political basis.  
The teaching of a sentimental history or a national narrative may seem to offer a 
satisfactory response to both liberal and national demands. It could focus students’ 
attention on the national story of their community, while encouraging them to endorse 
their existing affiliation to the group. Such endorsement, according to defenders of the 
compatibility thesis, should not take place at the expense of democratic affiliations. Kersh 
(2003, 1) for example suggests that “any project promoting responsible citizenship must 
address issues of national belonging in explicit detail.” However this perspective cannot 
offer an appropriate solution to the problem at hand, namely, the inclusion of both 
democratic perspectives and patriotic affiliations in the teaching of civics and history. 
First, the teaching of sentimental history goes against teaching critical thinking, and even 
against the very notion of autonomy. As Brighouse convincingly claims, “[the state] 
wrongs the child by conditioning his or her consent to the state, thus jeopardizing his or 
her ability to give the freely offered consent that is the marker of liberal legitimacy.” 
(2003, 165-6) Many have argued similarly about the teaching of patriotism as well as 
autonomy, that by cultivating it the state may undermine its own legitimacy. That is 
because legitimacy has to rest on a consent given autonomously by the citizens. When the 
conditions for this consent are instilled by the state, the consent can hardly be regarded as 
free, and thus does not suffice as a legitimizing factor.    
In addition, teaching sentimental history is both politically and pragmatically 
flawed. It is politically unwarranted because it tends to silence dissenting perspectives of 
history, and thus suppress pluralism for the sake of expressing a narrow and shallow 
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notion of patriotic pride. It is pragmatically flawed because teaching a noble version of 
history, creating a pantheon of heroes that are expected to confer legitimacy on the state’s 
institutions (as Galston suggests) stands a grave risk of promoting, in the long run, the 
very opposite sentiments than it sets up to promote. The “spirit of detached spectatorship” 
which Rorty (1999) laments, the “cynicism that sugar-coated history produces when 
youngsters get older” (Nash, 1999, 15) results from the sobering realization of the 
complexities of history which were concealed by the teachers and textbooks. This change 
of perspective that occurs to students often in a later stage of their studies can render 
them cynical, detached or hostile to the aims of their patriotic education.  
So much may be true in peace as much as in wartime. But wartime creates further 
challenges to the possibility of convergence among civic education, patriotic education 
(or the inculcation of national sentiments) and democratic education. The fundamental 
challenge that wartime presents to the education system is that of preserving democratic 
commitments. The propensity of citizens and government alike during wartime is to 
waive or suspend some of their democratic commitments in lieu of security concerns. The 
focal point of the relations between government and civil society changes in the direction 
of heavier expectations from citizens to contribute to the state; a diminished public 
agenda and a restricted public deliberation; lack of transparency and a weakened 
commitment to civic liberties. Confronting these problematic aspects of democratic 
citizenship with a sentimental version of national history does not seem to be a promising 
educational endeavor. The attempt to unite the citizenry in patriotic allegiance 
presupposes a conception of citizenship as a given aspect of personal and group identity. 
It assumes a unified understanding of national identity, history and tradition (see also 
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Archard, 1999). This presupposition goes not only against pluralism, but also against the 
democratic aims of expansive education. If we are to teach citizenship as shared fate – a 
basic requirement of expanding the study of civic education to include both patriotism 
and democratic values – we cannot rely on the determinate traditions which provide the 
basis for the sentimental teaching of history.  
Moreover, teaching sentimental versions of history goes against the common 
good and national interests, by way of enhancing the endorsement of the war culture. The 
education system has long been charged to be a leading cause for the perseverance of war 
(Marsden 2000). In 1926, Scott wrote: “It may be that nationalistic education is the chief 
underlying cause of the war.” (255) A decade later, Schlesinger observed: “Among the 
possible causes of war, education holds a particular and significant place . . . for in so far 
as it embodies dangerous nationalistic prejudices, it is a means of disseminating them 
constantly to all the people. It is the seed of international discord for both present and 
future generations.” (1938, xiii) Ruth Firer eloquently demonstrates how education, as a 
“part of any hegemonic culture, very often reflect(s) and reproduce(s) it.” (2002, 56) Firer 
demonstrates how Israeli textbooks and curricular guidelines have such perpetuating 
effect in circumstances of war. By failing to balance the social need of unity and mutual 
support, expressed by the narrowing conception of patriotism, with the requirement of 
preserving a democratic public sphere, the education system contributes to the war 
culture, and thus betrays the long-term perseverance interests of society.  
Alternatively, by teaching citizenship and nationalism as shared fate, the public 
education system can endorse the long-term democratic aims of public education along 
with supportive the short-term needs of belligerent citizenship. This approach would 
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mandate teaching history through a nuanced understanding of nationhood as a mutual 
social construct that is both informed by and constructive of individual and group identity 
(see also Smith, 2003). This constructive suggestion is meant to foster unity without 
abandoning critical perspectives, and to teach wider, more open forms of patriotism that 
still satisfy the moral realities and social expectations of wartime. Teaching a pluralist 
version of history that endorses national identification has to be practiced with a 
background understanding of nationhood as a communal historical enterprise of shared 
fate. In this sense, the teaching of a ‘usable past’ (to use Fullinwider’s term) would 
constitute the study of history as a continual interpretation of nationality as a shared 
project. It requires constructing the curriculum with an understanding of citizenship and 
national affiliation not only as a given, essential part of an individual’s identity, but also 
as part of her fate as shared with other members of her community. As this is a more 
flexible conception of national affiliation, it allows for accommodations of various sub-
groups and diverse narratives into the teaching of history (and civics). While pluralistic 
and diverse, it does not shun away from fostering patriotism as an integral part of public 
education, with the understanding that some periods in a nation’s existence – such as 
wartime – give rise to further emphasis on this aspect of education. Even in such times, 
however, critical thought and even more so pluralism need not be abandoned, for the 
shared fate of the national group corresponds with the diverse aims of the groups that 
make up the nation. In other words, when patriotism is derivative not solely of identity 
but of shared fate, it can be taught as a flexible notion that accommodates qualified both 
liberal-democratic perspectives and conservative ones.  
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Why in Schools? 
What should school children be expected to know about their nation, its culture 
and norms? Should history and social studies instill patriotism or, alternatively, offer an 
exercise in critical thinking? Similarly divisive questions arise in the context of civic 
studies: should students focus on the formal functions of government and the 
technicalities of democratic processes - relatively manageable and measurable tasks? Or 
should they devote their time to ‘learning the conflicts’ (see Graff 1992) and try to 
unravel the development of ideas such as freedom or democracy in American history (or 
globally)? Should teachers inculcate virtues, or teach an appreciation of complex 
meanings and manifestations of ideas?  
These and other related debates have been brewing for decades in the academe 
and the public and have spiked after 9/11. The changing conceptions of citizenship, civic 
virtue, patriotism and national affiliation that are characteristic of wartime are reflected in 
books and mass media discussions.(Giroux 2003; Ignatieff 2004; Ravitch and Weiner 
2005) As in many other public debates, perspectives often collapse to fit familiar 
conservative-liberal lines. It is common to hear the one side advocating the stressing of 
American virtues and the great heroes of the past, and blaming the other side as moral 
relativist, unpatriotic and demonizing the nation; while the other side focuses on critical 
capacities and multiple perspectives, depicting the former perspective as jingoistic and 
nurturing unrightful sentiments.  
Some of them strive to unpack the question, what are the needs of a society at war 
as they pertain to the education system? If my argument for regarding patriotism as civic 
virtue is correct, does it necessarily follows that it needs to be taught in schools? I would 
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like to suggest that it is so, and that schools indeed can provide a valuable service to 
society at war if they sensitively navigate their way between society’s pressing demands 
(or interests) and its longer term needs (again, or interests).  
Perseverance can be determined as any society’s first need. However, in war the 
implications of this need to the political sphere are blurred; additionally, the educational 
implications of this prerequisite can vary widely. What does it mean for a society to 
survive? The survival of a group is in a sense a metaphor, as long as physical extinction 
of all members is not an immediate threat; the focus of the discussion of group survival is 
commonly cultural rather than physical. What is at stake is the survival of the national or 
cultural group as it exists at present. This is the source of the prerequisite to preserve the 
social structure, the core values or the political ideology that represent the group’s 
‘spirit.’ The need to preserve society as it is, including the social ability to reconstruct 
and critically reform itself through its proper institutions, is part of the quest for survival, 
second only to actual physical survival of the nation. 
The crude educational interpretation of the quest for national survival is 
manifested in the wartime argument that the state, in order to survive, needs to cultivate 
in future citizens the emotional disposition that would enable them, even compel them, to 
defend their country. It is based at minimum on the suggestion that even if patriotic 
education is objectionable in times of peace, the social needs during conflict call for its 
endorsement because it may help support the country through the challenges of war. This 
argument represents one of the undesirable aspects of belligerent citizenship. The 
espousal of unifying patriotism and other aspects of belligerent citizenship by the public 
schooling system is perilous, for it impedes democratic justice, as well as replicates the 
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circumstances of conflict. Democratic education entails facilitating democratic 
inclinations, not enlisting students for their future roles as fighters. The pressures that the 
public puts before the education system to produce citizen-warriors, to inculcate the 
values of narrow patriotic unity, to suppress dissenting voices, should be faced with an 
expansion of public education’s focus on the love of country, along with an unwavering 
commitment to democracy. This dual focus is properly manifested in the endorsement of 
a public historical understanding of national membership as shared fate. It should be 
understood and practiced in the context of war as a commitment of the public education 
system to work with the more productive aspects of belligerent citizenship to support 
endurance while maintaining democratic affiliations.  
 
Teaching patriotism in a way that will expand its limits and enrich it with further 
perspectives supports the immediate needs of society to unite in order to endure conflict, 
as well as its longer term aims of preserving democracy and its basic value structure. In 
addition, the educational effort to expose future citizens to the broader possibilities 
contained under the umbrella term ‘patriotism’ can promote the democratic educational 
aim of autonomy as well. As I suggested, wartime or belligerent patriotism is analyzed by 
some social and political psychologists as an uncritical response to fear and the sense of 
vulnerability to impending threat. The rally around the flag effect after 9/11, for example, 
was an attempt to make sense of the unfathomable violence and destruction; uniting as 
Americans gave political meaning to the attacks. In addition the patriotic unity made it 
possible to exchange the feelings of vulnerability and fear with those of bravery, 
camaraderie and hope. With the continuation of the conflict, and the ensuing belligerent 
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conceptualization of citizenship, the narrow form of patriotism lost some of its rigid 
aspects as well as its social value. Still it defines to a large extent the ways in which 
social institutions, and parts of the public, envision membership in the nation. Hence 
patriotism, ideally characterized as an aspect of one’s identity as well as a shared project 
one participates in, should be more autonomously chosen for it to properly correspond 
with the requirements of democratic education. Choosing among varied understandings 
and manifestations of the love of country provides a way out of the ‘hounded woman’ 
problem, by providing us with options that go beyond the confining conceptualizations 
which impede our autonomy.  
Expanding the notion of patriotism as reflected and molded in the educational 
process can provide the conditions for realizing this demand. By presenting students with 
a more varied notion of patriotism, and soliciting from them a host of perspectives on the 
relations between citizen and nation-state, teachers can support its autonomous 
acceptance (or rejection). They can simultaneously support the infiltration of expanded 
notions of patriotism into the public sphere, which would be both accepting of the need to 
unite in times of war, and of the democratic claim for diversity and inclusion. 
The teaching of national sentiments and patriotism should thus be accepted as part 
of the curriculum, much as deliberation on forms of patriotism should become part and 
parcel of the discussions of democratic affiliations and commitments. Creating citizens is 
the first and foremost responsibility of a public education system in a democratic country. 
A country that aims to maintain the democratic commitments of its citizenry in order to 
ensure the perseverance of democracy through times of conflict can never subordinate its 
“long range values,” even in the face of the “life and death needs of today or tomorrow.” 
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Moreover, the pressures that the public puts before the education system to 
produce citizen-warriors, to inculcate the values of narrow patriotic unity, to suppress 
dissenting voices, should be faced with an unwavering commitment to democracy on the 
part of the education system. Preserving democracy can go hand in hand with endorsing a 
public historical understanding of national membership as shared fate. It should be 
understood and practiced in the context of war as a commitment of the public education 
system to work with the more productive aspects of belligerent citizenship and patriotism 
to support endurance while maintaining democratic affiliations. Thus the teaching of 
patriotism should not be abandoned, but expanded to include further perspectives into a 
wider framework of democratic education.  
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